This paper demonstrates a fallacy of the wage differential between educational statuses. A large number of studies have based their approaches upon the wage ratio between educational statuses.
Introduction
This paper demonstrates a fallacy of the wage differential between educational statuses. This fallacy has a vital and far-reaching influence on the empirical analysis of education and wages as a whole.
Education can be analyzed in economics from two major empirical viewpoints. The first is from the viewpoint of microeconomics, pioneered by Schultz (1963) and Becker (1964) . Mincer (1974) stylizes the wage equation. The causal effects of education, self-selection and unobserved ability are keywords in this viewpoint. Educational status is a textbook example of an endogenous variable. Griliches (1977) summarizes the econometric problems. A number of papers analyze the causal effects of education using instrumental variables and fixed effect estimations, as summarized by Card (2001) . Trostel et al. (2002) estimates the economic returns in 28 countries using data from the International Social Survey Programme.
The second viewpoint is that of macroeconomics, which deals with the endogenous growth theory and wage differentials. The focus on the macro wage differential between educational statuses has undergone a change in the last two decades. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Levy and Murnane (1992) analyze the widening disparity in the US using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This research subject has extended beyond the US. Freeman and Katz, eds (1995) compile cross-country and individual country studies, and Acemoglu (2003) reviews differential trends in wage inequality in the US/UK and Europe using data from the CPS and the Luxembourg Income Studies.
The widening disparity gives rise to the question of how it came about. The most common idea in the 1990s was that technological progress that occurred at that time was favorable to high-skilled labor.
In general, labor statistics do not contain any direct indicators of labor-skill. This is partly because the definition of labor-skill is obscure. Leuven et al. (2004) explains international relative wage differences using literacy scores; however, most studies use educational status as a proxy for labor-skill. They have little choice but to view higher educated workers as higher skilled ones, and lower educated workers as lower skilled ones. They substantially consider the college wage premium as the skill wage premium.
While most of the studies with regard to the widening disparity lay emphasis on a change in qualitative labor demand, this paper demonstrates a labor supply trick. Elementary mathematics can demonstrate this simple but crucial trick that brings to light the fallacy of wage differentials. The fallacy is directly related to wage differentials from the macroeconomic viewpoint. Moreover, the idea presented in this paper has a vital influence on the microeconomic viewpoint. It is strongly related to the empirical analysis of education and wages as a whole. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the fallacy using elementary mathematics 1 and examples. Section 3 demonstrates the relationship between the advancement rate to higher education and the wage differential by taking into account the shape of the distribution and human capital formation. Although univariate distributions require that the educational status must divide the wage distribution unrealistically, Section 4 demonstrates that bivariate distributions can duplicate a realistic wage distribution. Some conclusions are offered in Section 5.
Idea and examples

Idea
Average wages classified by educational status are basic information in analyses of wage differentials.
A wage ratio can be calculated by dividing the average wage of higher educational status by that of lower educational status. The wage ratio is a primary indicator of the wage differential or the return from education; partly because of simplicity, but mainly because of the non-availability of data. In most cases, the higher educated workers imply college graduates and the lower educated workers imply high-school ones. The college/high-school wage differential is considered to be a primary indicator of educational effect and skill premium. Although in this field there is a tendency to take the logarithm, the essence remains unchanged as long as it is a monotonic transformation.
The wage ratio is the relative wage of higher educated workers based on that of lower educated workers.
The ratio is invariant even if the numerator and the denominator change at the same rate, such as due to rising prices or changes in the entire real wages. While it may appear that the wage ratio is an easy and plausible indicator enabling the determination of educational effects, it is open to misconstruction.
The wage ratio has a simple but crucial trick.
Let me present this with a simple example. I shall hereafter use the term capability to describe potential productivity. For simplicity, I tentatively assume that education has no effect on capability and wage. £ Assumptions in a simple example ¢ ¡ 1. Three men whose capabilities are A > B > C, respectively come into the world.
2. Man proceeds to higher education in order of the capability.
3. Three men receive A, B, and C wages respectively in labor market according to the marginal productivity principle.
"How does the wage ratio of higher/lower educational status change if the educational advancement rate 2 increases?" The results are as follows.
phase 1 : when only A proceeds to higher education (1) In these numerical values, due to the phase transition, the numerator decreases by approximately 16.7% from 3 to 2.5, and the denominator decreases by approximately 33.3% from 1.5 to 1. The wage ratio diminishes because the rate of decrease of the denominator exceeds that of the numerator. As referred to earlier, the wage ratio would be invariant if the numerator and the denominator change at the same rate.
Conversely, advancement rates have an impact on the wage ratio, except in the special case of same-rate change. Each worker receives a constant wage in this example. It is obvious that the wage ratio changes as a trick even if both the labor market and the educational effects remain unchanged. An average can be derived by dividing an aggregated value by the total number. I calculate the average capability of the higher educational status.
the aggregated capability of the higher educational status (5)
the total number of the higher educational status (6)
AU : the average capability of the higher educational status (7) AU is an increasing function of D. It applies to any other type of distribution [Proposition 1]. The implication of this proposition is obvious. When the advancement rate increases and the dividing line moves towards the left, it includes people whose capability is the most inferior from the viewpoint of the higher educational status. Hence, the average capability of the higher educational status decreases.
Similarly, I calculate the average capability of the lower educational status.
the total number of the lower educational status
AL : the average capability of the lower educational status (10) AL is an increasing function of D. It also applies to any other type of distribution [Proposition 2].
Similarly, the implication of this proposition is obvious. When the advancement rate increases and the dividing line moves towards the left, it excludes people whose capability is the most superior from the viewpoint of the lower educational status. Hence, the average capability of the lower educational status decreases.
As a consequence, the fractional number of the averages corresponding to the wage ratio or the college premium is
the wage ratio (11)
The ratio definitely depends on the dividing line D. Next, I differentiate the ratio with respect to D in 4 order to examine the effect of D on the wage ratio.
The first-order derivative is a negative value. Therefore, the wage ratio decreases when the dividing line moves towards the right. On the contrary, the shifting of the dividing line towards the left implies an increase in the advancement rate and causes an increase in the wage ratio. In addition,
The second-order derivative is a positive value. In a uniform distribution, the wage ratio expands at an accelerated pace with an increase in the higher educational status rate. Table 1 shows a numerical example of a uniform distribution. The minimum wage ratio cell is represented in bold font. In this case, the minimum upper rate (20%) results in the minimum wage ratio between the two averages.
A Case of realistic distribution
It is natural to assume that the actual wage and capability follow a mountain-shaped distribution as typified by a normal or a log-normal distribution like Figure 2 . The next section gives a detailed demonstration; however, here is an introduction of mountain-shaped distribution that can be examined by hand calculation. Table 2 indicates the relationship between the upper rate and the wage ratio on the mountain-shaped distribution. In this numerical value, the minimum upper rate (10%) brings the wage ratio to 2.143. Next, the second-minimum upper rate (20%) brings the minimum wage ratio to 2.118.
Moreover, an upper rate of more than 50% increases the wage ratio. In summary, the wage ratio begins to increase reversely after a decrease if the upper rate increases.
The wage ratio expands monotonically in a uniform distribution with an increase in the upper rate. In a realistic distribution, the wage ratio increases after a decrease under the same conditions. In either case, the ratio between averages hinges on the dividing line.
3 In other words, the wage ratio strongly depends on the educational advancement rate. The wage ratio can change as a trick regardless of educational effects and individual wage variations.
Simulation of the ratio between averages
This section presents simulations taking into consideration human capital formation. Based on discrete distribution, Simulation-1 and Simulation-2 are organized as follows: The upper left table presents the given capability and frequency. For the sake of simplicity, the total number setting is considered to be 100. The upper right graph draws them visually. The table in the middle left is the result of division; the minimum wage ratio cell is represented in bold font. The figure in the middle right draws the relationship between the upper rate and the ratio between averages. The middle portion indicates a case where there is no human capital formation. It is nothing more than a detailed presentation of the numerical example given previously. The lower left figure illustrates a relationship based on human capital formation as a constant value addition. It suggests that when a person proceeds to higher education, his/her capability increases additively, such as (+2). The lower right figure presents a case of multiplicative human capital formation, such as (×1.2). In this case, the increment depends on the prior capability.
Simulation-2 is a parallel shift (+3) version of Simulation-1. Despite having the same distribution shape, the relationship between the the upper rate and the ratio between averages is different from that in Simulation-1. One question that arises here is regarding the measurement of capability. In Simulation-1, the person at the topmost position is ten times as capable as the one at the lowermost position. This gap reduces to 3.25 times in Simulation-2. An additional variation causes a change in the ratio between averages, but no change is caused by a multiplicative one.
It might be useful to recall the example on uniform distribution. The ratio in (11) 
L. The derivative with respect to t is
On the other hand, multiplication of U , D, and L by t does not affect the ratio as they cancel out. In very simple terms, if I multiply the numerator and the denominator by the same number, the fractional number is invariant. On the other hand, if I add the same number to the numerator and the denominator, the fractional number decreases, converging with 1.
4 For this reason, the ratio between averages depends on their measurement. For example, the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) has a non-zero minimum score. It has a different dividing point for calculating the minimum ratio from a zero-minimum examination. If the framework can be empirically applied, the capability is measured in terms of the productivity or wage. Therefore, this paper treats the ratio between averages as the wage ratio.
Both in Simulation-1 and Simulation-2, little difference exists in the line shape between these lower figures and the middle figure (no increase). If it is assumed that capability or wage follows a mountainshape, regardless of human capital formation, the ratio increases after it decreases once along with the increase in the upper rate.
Simulation-3 is based on continuous log-normal distribution with mean 5 and standard deviation 1.
The integral of the frequency function from 0 to ∞ equals 1. In this case, I can consider the density 4 L'Hôpital's rule is used to compute the limit.
6 function of capability. Simulation-3A represents the case in which there is no human capital formation.
Simulation-3B assumes that the capability increases by 10% on proceeding to higher education. The essence is already mentioned in the discrete simulations. Additionally, the upper rate that brings about minimum value is invariant if human capital is formed in multiplicative forms [Proposition 3].
The previous section illustrates that the wage ratio changes as a trick even if there is neither individual wage variations nor the human capital formation. The result is independent of human capital formation.
Even though education has real effects, the line shape of the wage ratio is almost a carbon copy of no effect. Conversely, the wage ratio is inappropriate to assess educational effects. Furthermore, in realistic mountain-shaped distributions, the wage ratio increases after decrease as the upper rate increases, regardless of educational effects.
Previous studies have proposed a number of hypotheses to explain the cause of the wage ratio change.
5
The share of higher educational status has been increasing in developed countries. Under these circumstances, the change in the wage ratio is a natural result regardless of educational effects or the labor market transition.
Simulation of bivariate distributions
This paper has hitherto assumed that people proceed to higher education in strict order of potential capability. It is a strong assumption. The decision to pursue higher education depends not only on capability or test scores but also on household income, location, character and so forth. Moreover, if this framework can be directly applied, the educational status would divide the wage distribution sharply.
However, it is observed that real wage distributions by educational status overlap. Some people earn poor scores but make a fortune and vice versa. This section demonstrates that although a one-to-one correspondence between educational status and wage fails to satisfy, this theory remains suitable for application using bivariate distributions.
First, supposing that there exists a joint distribution of academic ability (a > 0) and labor productivity (w > 0), I define the density function of a bivariate distribution.
f (a, w) ≥ 0 joint density function of academic ability and labor productivity (14) f a (a) = The labor productivity distribution in an educational status can be expressed as the integral taken 5 Levy and Murnane (1992) use the ratio of medians instead of averages. Although the ratio of medians seems to have a higher level than the ratio of averages, the change is similar to that of average in mountain-shaped distributions.
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between the academic ability of D l and D u .
I then build an intermediate function.
An academic ability distribution in an educational status is as follows.
Second, I specify the bivariate distribution. The marginal density function of academic ability follows a log-normal distribution in analogy with Simulation-3.
It is highly unlikely to attain a one-to-one correspondence between academic ability and labor productivity. However, it is safe to assume that there exists a positive correlation between the two. labor productivity scatters on following a normal distribution with the mean of the academic ability and the standard deviation as σ b . I specify the conditional density function of w given that a =ā.
the conditional density function of w given that a =ā (21) Given an academic ability, the mean of labor productivity corresponds to the academic ability by the assumption.
E[f (w |ā)]
=ā the conditional expected value of w given that a =ā (22) The joint density function of academic ability and labor productivity is
Third, I specify the parameters of the distribution. In analogy with Simulation-3, the marginal density function of academic ability follows a log-normal distribution with mean 5 and standard deviation 1.
E[a]
= µ a = exp(μ + σ b is the only difference between Simulation-4 and Simulation-5. It is the standard deviation between the academic ability and the labor productivity. Since σ b in Simulation-4 is small, the educational status divides the wage distribution bluntly. Since σ b in Simulation-5 is relatively large, the dividing point becomes so indistinct that it is difficult to believe that the other dimension divides the distribution. The approach of σ b to zero implies the approach to a univariate distribution. The identification of a with w is a special case of the bivariate distribution. In the special case, the educational status divides the wage distribution sharply.
As shown in (21) and (22), both Simulation-4 and Simulation-5 are built on the basis of the assumption that academic ability generates labor productivity while preserving the mean. Therefore, these simulations satisfy the condition that
If one dividing line corresponds to the other simulation, the average labor productivity in an educational status also corresponds. These average wage ratios are equivalent to the special case of univariate distribution. As far as the mean is concerned, it is independent of σ b .
Though the real wage differential between the educational statuses tends to widen with age, the wage distributions by educational status overlap within each age bracket. The bivariate simulation can duplicate the overlapping wage distributions. The bivariate simulations are based on the assumption that capable persons do not always pursue higher education despite their inclination to do so. Therefore, the overlapping wage distribution is anything but a disproof of the dividing theory. It is a natural result of reasonable assumptions. Furthermore, with regard to indicators of averages, a univariate distribution can substitute for a bivariate one.
Conclusion
This paper began with an introduction to the fallacy of wage ratios. A simple numerical example reveals this fallacy. Univariate distribution simulations show that the wage ratio changes regardless of educa-9 tional effects. Bivariate distribution simulations demonstrate that although a one-to-one correspondence between educational status and wage is not satisfied, this theory remains suitable for application.
This fallacy is directly related to wage differentials from the macroeconomic viewpoint. Even if there has truly been a change in the wage ratio between educational statuses, there is a possibility that individual wages have not changed. On the other hand, this fallacy has a vital influence on the microeconomic viewpoint. The wage ratios of averages are inappropriate to measure the educational effects. If the wage equation cannot control potential productivity perfectly, the estimated return to education must be biased. Further, the magnitude of the bias depends on the advancement rate to higher education. In a realistic mountain-shaped distribution, the biased return increases after a decrease as the advancement rate increases, regardless of educational effects.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1:
Suppose that capability is x > 0, the density function is f (x) ≥ 0 and
the aggregated capability of the higher educational status (25)
the total number of the higher educational status (26)
AU : the average capability of the higher educational status (27)
The differential equation (28) is positive because each component is positive. Then, if D increases, the average capability of higher educational status increases.
the total number of the lower educational status (30)
AL : the average capability of the lower educational status (31)
The differential equation (32) is positive because each component is positive. Then, if D increases, the average of capability lower educational status increases.
Proposition 3:
I. Remains the same
If education has no effect on the capability, the average capability of the higher educational status (AU ) and the wage ratio (W R) are as follows.
The derivative of W R with respect to D is
II. Constant rate increase [a ≥ 0] If education has a multiplicative effect on the capability, the increased average capability of the higher educational status (AU a ) and the increased wage ratio (W R a ) are as follows.
The derivative of W R a with respect to D is
( 35) and (38) Table 2 An Example of Realistic Distribution
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